UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/23266
4 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Executive Committee of Shabab Alwatan Organization in the Sudan in relation to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) dated 3 April 1991.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Joseph LAGU
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

We address you today on behalf of the youth of the Sudan, inasmuch as you have the role of protector of international security, peace and justice.

You all know the adversities which the people, including children, women and old people, of Iraq are suffering as a result of the economic embargo, namely:

- A state of slow starvation for lack of food;

- The death of children owing to lack of food and medicine;

- Terrible deterioration in humanitarian and environmental conditions in this fraternal State.

As you know, paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 states that the embargo shall not apply to basic foodstuffs and materials needed to meet humanitarian needs.

We draw your attention to the fact that the Government of Iraq has committed itself to the implementation of all the Council's resolutions.

Accordingly, we ask you to transmit the request of the youth of the people of the Sudan for the lifting of the economic embargo against the fraternal people of Iraq and the non-imposition of any conditions that infringe on the sovereignty of this people and its fundamental rights provided for in international covenants.

In conclusion, the world today looks to your credibility and your adherence to the standards of justice, and the violation of these standards will lead to complications in the future of this international Organization.

The Executive Leadership of the Youth
of the Nation Organization

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4 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the statement by the Federal Government of Yugoslavia from its session held on 2 December 1991.

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Darko SILOVIC
Permanent Representative of
Yugoslavia to the United Nations

Annex

The Federal Executive Council, at its 189th session held on 2 December 1991, under the Chairmanship of its President, Mr. Ante Markovic, reviewed the activities of the federal authorities in regard to the peace initiatives for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

The Federal Executive Council supported United Nations Security Council resolution 721 (1991) adopted on the initiative of and in agreement with the Government of Yugoslavia, considering that it represents an important step towards the restoration of peace in the country.

In that context, the Federal Executive Council is of the opinion that the present mission of Mr. Cyrus Vance, the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia, is of the utmost importance. The success of this mission primarily depends on the consistent and complete realization of the Geneva Accord, as a basic precondition for the reinstatement of peace in all parts of the country.

The Federal Executive Council has always advocated the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis through peaceful means, without the use of force. The cease-fire is necessary, in the first place, with a view to averting the war atrocities, further loss of life and destruction, as well as social hardships, imminent even without the war, which is pushing living conditions to the verge of existence.

The Federal Executive Council considers that it is of utmost priority at this moment to create the necessary conditions for the immediate deployment of the "blue helmets", even in a smaller number, since full-scale operation requires some time.

Without the cease-fire in place, it is certain that they cannot be sent to Yugoslavia. The Federal Executive Council also stresses that the presence of peace-keeping forces would create the conditions for the resumption of The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia as soon as possible, thus ensuring a peaceful and democratic solution for all in Yugoslavia.

The Federal Executive Council again stresses the need that parallel with the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, conditions for life and work in peace and security of property of all citizens in all parts of the country, have to be defined. In order to achieve that, the agreement on the country's functioning in the transitional period is necessary.

The Federal Executive Council again points out that the Government will support only those acts that contribute to putting emotions and tensions to rest, to the cessation of war conflicts and all other grave consequences of this senseless war.

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S/23268
4 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 9 (b) (i) OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991), ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to recall paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991, which requests the Secretary-General to submit, every six months after the adoption of the resolution, progress reports on the implementation of the provisions of section C of resolution 687 (1991) relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

You will further recall that, on 25 October 1991, a first report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) was circulated on your instructions to the Security Council in document S/23165. This first report summarized all activities undertaken by the Special Commission and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) up to the middle of October 1991. Additionally, at the request of the Director-General of IAEA, the reports prepared by seven inspection teams led by the Agency have been circulated as Security Council documents (S/22788, S/22837, S/22986 and Corr.1, S/23112, S/23122 and S/23215). A report of the eighth IAEA-led inspection will be circulated in the course of December.

To comply with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991), I am transmitting herewith the text of a progress report which brings up to date the first report referred to in the previous paragraph.

I would be most grateful if you would circulate the attached second report as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rolf EKÉUS
Executive Chairman
Office of the Special Commission

Annex

Second report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), covers the work of the Commission for the period from 15 October to 4 December 1991. This second report is confined to operational activities and matters directly pertinent thereto as these are the areas which need to be brought up to date to provide, together with the first report by the Executive Chairman (S/23165), a comprehensive picture of the establishment and functioning of the Special Committee since the adoption of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 699 (1991).

ATTITUDE OF IRAQ

2. The first report by the Executive Chairman contained, in paragraphs 16 to 19, a comprehensive account of the attitude of Iraq. In the period under review this attitude has not changed. In respect of sites and activities declared by Iraq and the issue of Iraq's participation in the destruction of chemical weapons, cooperation at the field level has been forthcoming. However, in respect of sites designated by the Special Commission, where the Commission and IAEA are acting on their own sources of information regarding possible clandestine conduct of proscribed activities, non-cooperation and obstruction continue to be encountered. There is thus no progress to report which would indicate a change of policy on the part of Iraq to one of candour, transparency and cooperation at all levels. As the Executive Chairman remarked in the first report, this is probably the one single element that could contribute most substantially to a timely and satisfactory implementation of the mandate of the Special Commission and of IAEA.

3. The Special Commission has had to remain vigilant in the period under review to prevent implementation of measures proposed by Iraq which could impinge upon the facilities, privileges and immunities of the Commission and of IAEA in matters such as the taking into and out of Iraq of all necessary equipment, materials and other items required for inspections and the analysis of their results and the taking of photographs at sites under inspection. So far the strong position taken by the Commission and the Chief Inspectors involved seems to have been successful in preserving the rights concerned.

4. With respect to ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 10 and 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the Special Commission has very recently received in New York from Iraq information which the Government states to be "the information required under resolution 687 (1991) that comes within the mandate of the Special Commission". Until the information is translated, the Commission cannot determine the extent to which it meets the substantive requirements of the Special Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1) which were unanimously approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991), although it may be observed that certain procedural requirements laid down in the plans as to time-limits and languages of submission have not been met. If the Commission and IAEA are to be in a position to carry out their functions in connection with ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission deems it to be of great importance that Iraq expressly recognize its obligations under the two plans and Security Council resolution 715 (1991). Such espress recognition is still awaited.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

5. Two more inspections were completed (IAEA 7/UNSCOM 19 and IAEA 8/UNSCOM 22), one each in October (11 to 22 October) and November (11 to 18 November), since the sixth nuclear inspection summarized in the previous report. In addition to the successful removal of unirradiated fuel from Iraq, the inspection teams focused much of their inspection activity on a number of sites associated with (a) Iraq's programme to design and develop the non-nuclear components of a nuclear weapon and (b) centrifuge component manufacture.

6. Significantly, Iraq provided for the first time to the seventh nuclear inspection team formal though incomplete written acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons programme:

> "Various research and studies of the sort to which you refer as 'weaponization' have been carried out. The objective in carrying out such research and studies was to establish the practical, technical and scientific requirements for a programme of this nature in the event that a political decision were to be taken to proceed in that direction."

7. The extensive and detailed documentation of the nuclear weapons programme that was obtained by the sixth inspection team, and its removal from Iraq only after that team's detainment in a parking lot for four days, preceded the Iraqi admission to the seventh team of having conducted research and studies on nuclear weapons. In fact, the seventh and eighth inspection teams visited designated facilities judged to be directly associated with the testing and development of the high-explosive components of the implosion system of a nuclear weapon. The characteristics of these facilities were considered inconsistent with Iraq's explanations of their purpose. Thus, Iraq's position that it conducted studies but had no programme to develop nuclear weapons is

inconsistent with both documents and inspection results that reveal a well-funded and broadly based programme involving sophisticated facilities for nuclear weapons development.

8. In the area of fissile material production, important questions put to Iraq remain unanswered. While much of the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) equipment has been turned over for destruction, the critical collector pockets which would permit confirmation of Iraq's assertions that only low levels of enrichment were achieved have not been produced for analysis. Substantial uncertainties also remain over the centrifuge programme where Iraq has produced some but not all parts and materials, and failed to reveal the sources of its supply of critical parts and materials. Even less information has been produced by Iraq on their efforts in the diffusion and chemical separation processes. All this is especially troubling in the light of preliminary results of sampling accomplished at Al Tuwaitha, and noted in the IAEA seventh inspection report (S/23215), that provide evidence of uranium enriched to 93 per cent in the isotope U^{235}. Additional sampling was undertaken by the seventh and eighth inspection teams. Analysis and further investigation are clearly required.

9. Iraq's recent record in the nuclear area is consistent with, if less dramatic than, its actions over the last six months that included the concealment of evidence of plutonium separation, of uranium enrichment, and of nuclear weapons development, of refusal to permit inspection teams to enter some sites and exit others, and confiscation of documents from inspectors in the course of an inspection. In sum, Iraq has not cooperated in the critical area of nuclear-weapons-related activity and the Special Commission and IAEA are some distance from achieving the transparency which is sought.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

10. Since the first report was prepared, two further chemical inspections have been completed, one being the long and detailed inspection of the Al Muthanna State Establishment (7 October to 8 November 1991) while the other visited a series of declared chemical munitions storage sites (22 October to 2 November 1991). There has also been a combined chemical and biological weapons inspection which visited (17 to 30 November 1991), at very short notice, a number of sites designated by the Special Commission as being of potential chemical weapons and/or biological weapons interest in addition to revisiting the original site at Salman Pak.

11. The technically very successful inspection of Al Muthanna (UNSCOM 17) compiled a comprehensive and detailed inventory of the site, including facilities, munitions, agents, agent condition, precursors and intermediates. Among the salient findings were the discovery of small quantities of the nerve agents sec.butyl sarin, n-butyl sarin and ethyl sarin, although Iraq has disputed the identification of the latter two agents. While the quantities found were of no direct military significance, the relevance of the finding lies in the fact that Iraq clearly had carried out research on nerve agents other than those previously declared.

12. Although the mustard agent at Al Muthanna was generally of good quality (typically 90 per cent), the nerve agents were found to have undergone extensive degradation and the agent content was very low, generally below 10 per cent and in some cases below the 1 per cent level. This new information may have significant repercussions for the process finally selected for the destruction of the nerve agents as well as for the safety hazards likely to be encountered during destruction; both aspects will need further consideration.

13. In general, the findings of the inspection at Al Muthanna were in substantial agreement with Iraq's declaration, although in the case of the 122 mm rockets a precise and full count was not possible as the rockets generally were found to be in a very dangerous condition. Explosive demolition was considered to be the safest means of achieving their destruction since opening and draining operations would be particularly hazardous.

14. The inspection of the remaining declared storage sites (UNSCOM 20) was likewise a successful operation. All the declared sites, some of them distant from Baghdad and therefore requiring the use of United Nations helicopter transport, were inspected, the chemical weapons munitions verified, counted and recorded; where it was safe to transport the munitions to Al Muthanna the necessary instructions to this effect were given to Iraq. At Al-Tuz, Khamisiyah and Muhammadiyat numbers of munitions were discovered, including but not restricted to 122 mm rockets, which were considered to be in too unsafe a condition to move and for which a drilling and draining operation would be very hazardous. A recommendation was made on safety grounds that these items should be destroyed <u>in situ</u> by explosive demolition. In a few cases, due to extensive destruction by coalition bombing, it was not possible to observe and count all munitions; when the damage had been less extensive the number and types of munitions observed accorded well with the Iraqi declarations.

15. The combined chemical and biological weapons inspection (UNSCOM 21), except for the revisit to Salman Pak, concentrated on short notice inspection of undeclared sites designated by the Special Commission; some 13 sites were inspected.

16. The inspection was completed only very recently and the full official report is therefore not at present available. Field reporting, however, indicates that no chemical-or-biological-weapons-related activities were associated with any of the designated sites. In the course of the inspection a small sub-team was dispatched to Al Muthanna to witness an Iraqi experiment with a simulant to prove the use of the modified pilot plant for exploratory work on the destruction of nerve agents; this was successful.

17. Since the first report was prepared a small (4 person) mission has visited Iraq for detailed technical discussions (11 to 15 November 1991) with Iraqi counterparts on various of the issues related to the destruction of chemical weapons and agents, with particular emphasis on the direct

involvement of Iraq in this process and on safety aspects. Issues discussed and on which the Special Commission team made recommendations included an Iraqi design for a mustard agent incinerator, the destruction of nerve agents by caustic hydrolysis, and the breaching and draining of munitions.

18. When, in the very near future, all the data compiled by UNSCOM 17 at the Al Muthanna State Establishment have been analysed, the Special Commission will have a very good understanding of Iraq's declared major primary chemical weapons site. Furthermore, the discussions on the destruction of chemical weapons and agents have resulted in a considerable improvement in technical understanding by both sides, particularly as regards the potential hazards involved in some operations and of the technologies potentially available for implementing the various destruction processes. Commencement of the destruction process early in 1992 can thus be confidently expected.

BALLISTIC MISSILES AND LONG-RANGE GUNS

19. With respect to ballistic missiles, by the end of 1991 two additional Special Commission ballistic missile inspections (UNSCOM 23 and UNSCOM 24) are expected to have been completed. To date, Special Commission inspection teams have, according to the latest revised data, supervised the destruction of 62 ballistic missiles, 18 fixed missile launch pads, 33 ballistic missile warheads, 127 missile storage support racks, a substantial amount of rocket fuel, an assembled 350 mm supergun, components of two 350 and two 1,000 mm superguns, and 1 tonne of supergun propellant.

20. So far, no information has come to light which clearly contradicts Iraq's disclosure of 5 July 1991 with respect to the status of its ballistic missile force. Nevertheless, the fact that Iraq continued to fire ballistic missiles throughout the Gulf war and still had a portion of its force following that war, despite what were, by all public accounts, the intensive efforts of coalition forces to find and destroy them, attests to the relative ease with which they could be concealed even in war. Special Commission inspection teams have found undeclared ballistic missile support equipment and noted Iraqi attempts to reuse previously destroyed missile transport vehicles.

21. The Special Commission is seeking further information, analysis of which may allow a more comprehensive understanding of this issue, and increase confidence in any assessments which may emerge. At the present time, however, as pointed out in the first report, important questions still remain unresolved, namely, whether Iraq continues to have any ballistic missiles in its possession, and its plans and progress in future ballistic missile development. The two ballistic missile inspections which are being undertaken this month should shed additional light on these questions.

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

22. The administrative issues outlined in paragraphs 25 to 31 of the first report remain unresolved, most particularly the issue of financing. The Special Commission is most grateful to record the receipt of additional voluntary contributions from Kuwait ($1,000,000) and Saudi Arabia ($1,730,000), which have enabled it to continue to function in the period under review. However, the shortage of readily available funds will become critical early next year, particularly if the Special Commission and IAEA are to proceed with the very costly removal of the spent irradiated fuel from Iraq.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

23. In the previous report, the full support of the Security Council, Governments, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat of the United Nations were identified as being of crucial importance in the carrying out of the mandate laid down in section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). This will certainly remain to be the case as the Special Commission and IAEA confront the difficult issues which will arise in connection with the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the facilities for their production and as the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification are put into full effect. Experience to date has shown that results can be achieved only where resolute stands are taken in response to challenges by Iraq to the implementation of various aspects of the mandate of the Special Commission and IAEA. Such resolute stands can be based only on the full support of the United Nations as a whole and its Member Governments in achieving all the basic objectives of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

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S/23269
4 December 1991
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

On the night of 1/2 November 1991, an Iraqi Scania tanker truck driven by Aqil Kazim Sa'd, accompanied by his assistant, Ibrahim Hamid Salman, both members of the Iraqi frontier police force, was delivering water to the Iraqi frontier posts located close to the Iraq-Saudi Arabia borders, when it lost its way, inadvertently entered Saudi territory in the area between the Saudi border posts at Al-Hashrah and Mukur al-Ni'am and was seized by the Saudi frontier authorities. At 0800 hours on 2 November 1991, the truck in question was seen in front of the Saudi Mukur al-Ni'am border post, and it is still being detained by the Saudis, together with its driver, and his assistant.

My Government, which holds the Saudi side responsible for the safety of the two Iraqi nationals indicated above, asks for your humanitarian intervention and requests you to take whatever steps you deem appropriate to induce the Saudi authorities to release them together with their vehicle and to repatriate them to Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23270
6 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of a series of Iraqi violations of the terms of the cease-fire.

1. On 4 October 1991, a group of 25 Iraqi soldiers were observed transfering equipment for building a trench at the geographical coordinates of 532-447 on the map of Sumar.

2. On 7 October 1991, six Iraqi soldiers were observed digging a canal at the geographical coordinates of 880-135 on the map of Halaleh.

3. On 7 October 1991, 11 Iraqi soldiers using a truck and a loader were observed planting a number of illuminating traps at the geographical coordinates of 291-821 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

4. On 10 October 1991, a well-equipped group of Iraqi soldiers were observed patrolling at the geographical coordinates of 857-179 on the map of Halaleh.

5. On 11 October 1991, Iraqi soldiers constructed a trench and an embankment and set up barbed wire at the geographical coordinates of 977-658 on the map of Mehran.

6. On 12 October 1991, at 1415 hours, a group of anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq fired from the geographical coordinates of 91-76 on the map of Siparuz at Iranian positions. Six other elements using a vehicle came to the area of confrontation to aid the first group. As a result of reaction by the Iranian guards, their vehicle was damaged and the anti-revolutionary elements retreated into Iraq. Two Iranian guards were injured in this incident.

7. On 13 October 1991, three Iraqi soldiers in white robes were observed monitoring the area at the geographical coordinates of 295-816 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

8. On 15 October 1991, a number of Iraqi soldiers fired an illuminating shot at the geographical coordinates of 29-82 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

9. On 18 October 1991, at 2100 hours, a number of Iraqi soldiers at the geographical coordinates of 54-44 on the map of Sumar approached the Iranian positions. Following the reaction of the Iranian guards they retreated into Iraqi territory.

10. On 19 October 1991, two Iraqi soldiers tried to infiltrate the area around the geographical coordinates of 507-777 on the map of Sizdeh. Following the reaction of Iranian guards they retreated into Iraqi territory.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23271
9 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 13 June 1991 to the President of the Security Council (S/22716) and the President's reply of 18 June 1991 (S/22717) concerning the composition of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II).

Having consulted the parties, I intend to deploy approximately 25 Finnish military personnel to UNAVEM II for a period of six to eight weeks, in order to carry out certain construction tasks which are urgently needed to improve the working and living conditions of the members of the Mission at Luanda as well as in the outposts. The personnel concerned will, with the consent of the Finnish Government, be temporarily assigned to Angola from existing peace-keeping operations in the Middle East.

As Finland has not previously contributed military personnel to UNAVEM II, I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ DE CUELLAR

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S/23272
9 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 3 December 1991 (S/23271) concerning the proposed deployment of Finnish military personnel to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), which has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Yuliy M. VORONTSOV
President of the
Security Council

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S/23273
9 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 (1987)

1. In paragraph 6 of resolution 598 (1987), adopted on 20 July 1987, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible in implementation of that request.

2. In the course of the negotiations during the past three years, I have had several opportunities to consult with the parties on paragraph 6. While those consultations enabled me to get a certain understanding of the divergent views held by both sides, they did not come to a stage where it was felt possible to submit a meaningful report to the Security Council.

3. Following the completion of the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 598 (1987), a renewed effort to fulfil the requirements of all other provisions of that resolution was called for in order to ensure the re-establishment of peace between Iran and Iraq in accordance with the comprehensive peace plan provided for by resolution 598 (1987) and thus to contribute substantially to the current requirements of peace and security in the region. Many of the steps I took in order to intensify all efforts in implementation of resolution 598 (1987) have been outlined in my report to the Security Council on that subject (S/23246).

4. For the purpose of paragraph 6, although elements of the positions of the two parties on that paragraph were known to me, I requested the Governments of Iran and Iraq, in identical letters dated 14 August 1991, to provide me in the most comprehensive manner possible with their detailed views on the subject-matter of that paragraph. At the same time, in order to obtain the fullest understanding of the subject-matter, I decided to consult separately some independent experts. On the basis of the replies provided by the parties dated 26 August 1991 for Iraq and 15 September 1991 for Iran, the consultations held with the parties in the past, all relevant information contained in the official documents of the United Nations since the beginning of the conflict and the information obtained from independent experts, I would

now like, in the light of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 598 (1987), to report to the Security Council.

5. It is evident that the war between Iran and Iraq, which was going to be waged for so many years, was started in contravention of international law, and violations of international law give rise to responsibility for the conflict, which question is at the centre of paragraph 6. The area of violation of international law that should be of specific concern to the international community in the context of paragraph 6 is the illegal use of force and the disregard for the territorial integrity of a Member State.

There were of course in the course of the conflict massive violations of various rules of international humanitarian law.

6. The Iraqi reply to my letter of 14 August 1991 is not a substantial one; therefore I am bound to rely on explanations given by Iraq earlier. That these explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact. Accordingly, the outstanding event under the violations referred to in paragraph 5 above is the attack of 22 September 1980 against Iran, which cannot be justified under the Charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law or any principles of international morality and entails the responsibility for the conflict.

7. Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran - which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict - in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens.

8. Of the numerous violations of humanitarian law which were committed during the Iran-Iraq war, many have already been documented by the United Nations and by the International Committee of the Red Cross. At the request of one or both of the parties I have for instance on several occasions dispatched expert missions to the theatre of war to investigate such violations as the use of chemical weapons, attacks on civilian areas and the bad treatment of prisoners of war. The results of those investigations were all reported to the Security Council and issued as Security Council documents. They referred, sadly enough, to the existence of evidence that serious violations of humanitarian law had indeed taken place. On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons ha[d] been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban centre lacking any protection against that kind of attack" (S/20134, annex). The Council expressed its dismay on the matter and its condemnation in resolution 620 (1988), adopted on 26 August 1988.

9. The events of the Iran-Iraq war, which for many years provided the news headlines in the world media, are well known to the international community. The position of the parties, expressed on many occasions in official documents, are also public knowledge. In my opinion it would not seem to

serve any useful purpose to pursue paragraph 6 of resolution 598 (1987). In the interest of peace and in line with the implementation of resolution 598 (1987) as a comprehensive peace plan, it is now imperative to move on with the settlement process. It is the careful construction of peaceful relations between the parties and of peace and security in the whole region that urgently needs to be tended to. The Security Council, in 1987, already offered the right approach, including in paragraph 8 of that resolution, which, if it had been timely implemented, might have spared the region from the further tragedy that followed. A system of good-neighbourly relations based on the respect of international law, as was envisaged by the Security Council, is essential in securing peace and stability in the region in the future. It is to be hoped that the Council's call will be heeded.

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General Assembly Security Council

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S/23274
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 67
STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 6 December 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States for December 1991 and on behalf of its members, I have the honour to transmit herewith the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its emergency session held at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, on Thursday, 5 December 1991, concerning the American-British threats directed against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with regard to the Pan Am aircraft incident.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 67, entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Lebanese Republic to the United Nations
Chairman of the Group of Arab States
for December

ANNEX

The Council of the League of Arab States convenes an emergency session at the request of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

In the morning of 5 December 1991, the Council of the League of Arab States convened an emergency meeting on the basis of a request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to consider the American-British threats with regard to the Pan Am aircraft incident. At the conclusion of its work, the League Council adopted the following resolution:

The Council of the League of Arab States, convened in emergency session on Thursday, 5 December 1991 on the basis of a request by the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Pursuant to the Pact of the League of Arab States, in particular article 6 thereof, and the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League,

Following a discussion of the charges directed against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland with regard to the incident of the aircraft which was downed over Scotland in 1988,

Appreciating the initiatives of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya aimed at containing the catastrophe resulting from this incident and its call for an international investigation; and appreciating also all the other international efforts,

Referring to the communiqué of the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States of 17 November 1991, in which the General Secretariat called upon all parties to exercise self-restraint and not to take any steps which might increase the tension in the Middle East at a time when international and Arab efforts had begun with a view to arriving at a just and comprehensive peace in the region,

Recalling Arab resolutions condemning all forms of terrorism and terrorist operations aimed at innocent civilians,

Proceeding from the principles of the United Nations and the League of Arab States concerning the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means and in a way that does not endanger international peace and security, and in particular article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Calling for avoidance of any economic or military actions which might cause the situation to escalate,

Decides as follows:

1. To affirm its solidarity with fraternal Libya and to commend its responsiveness regarding the investigation of the facts surrounding this regrettable incident;

2. To call for the establishment of a joint commission of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to study all documentation relating to the matter, in accordance with the existing cooperation between the two organizations, with the possible participation of other parties as observers;

3. To provide all possible means to facilitate the task of this Commission;

4. To entrust the Secretary-General with the task of following up the implementation of this resolution and to consider the Council as permanently in session for the purpose of following up developments in this situation.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23275
9 December 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 9 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that the United States Air Force continued to violate Iraqi airspace during the period from 25 November to 4 December 1991 for the purpose of surveillance and provocation, as follows:

25-26 November 1991

Twenty-nine sorties, flown by 13 two-aircraft formations and one three-aircraft formation at speeds of 720-900 km/h and at altitudes of 1,000-6,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah and Tall Afar.

At 0810, 0900, 1110 and 1655 hours, four formations, each consisting of two F-16s, overflew Faruq airfield at speeds of 500-600 km/h and at altitudes of 50-150 m.

26-27 November 1991

Twenty-two sorties, flown by nine two-aircraft formations, one three-aircraft formation and one single aircraft at 600-950 km/h and at altitudes of 5,500-18,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Zakho, Amadiyah, Rawanduz and Tall Afar.

At 1305 and 1415 hours, two formations, each consisting of two F-16s, overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 700 km/h and at altitudes of 50-500 m.

At 1555 hours, two Jaguars overflew Firnas airport at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 200 m.

27-28 November 1991

Two sorties, at a speed of 780 km/h, centred on Amadiyah and on the Iraq-Turkey border strip.

1-2 December 1991

Twelve sorties, flown by five two-aircraft formations and two single aircraft at speeds of 600-950 km/h and at altitudes of 2,000-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar and Zakho.

3-4 December 1991

Nine two-aircraft formations flying at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-8,000 m and centring on Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Zakho, Dohuk and Amadiyah.

At 1250 hours, two Tornadoes overflew Faruq airport at a speed of 700 km/h and at an altitude of 10 m.

4-5 December 1991

Eighteen sorties flown by nine two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 1,500-6,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Zakho, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Tall Afar, Ayn Zalah and Rawanduz.

At 1120 hours, three Tornadoes overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 50 m.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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S/23276
9 December 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 9 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that the Iranian side has committed fresh violations of the provisions of the cease-fire between the two countries, as follows:

1. At 1600 hours on 20 November 1991, one of the men on the Iranian side at the Iranian post fired two shots with a light weapon in the direction of our units at geographical coordinates 954739 in the southern sector (map of Sibah).

2. At 1630 hours on 22 November 1991, one of the men on the Iranian side at the Iranian post in the Iranian centre at geographical coordinates 022941 fired in the direction of our units in the southern sector (map of Sheikh Faris).

3. At 0925 hours on 27 November 1991, an Iranian helicopter was observed coming from the Iranian rear in the direction of Khosravi. It circled over Khosravi guard post in the area of separation in the central sector (map of Khanagin).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23277
10 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Austria and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 698 (1991) of 14 June 1991,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus of 15 October 1991, 1/

1. Decides that, with effect from 1 January 1992, the costs of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for which the United Nations is responsible shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations, as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep under review the question of the costs of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and its composition, taking into account inter alia progress made in his mission of good offices.

Notes

1/ S/23144.

91-49066 4057Z (E)

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

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A/46/766
S/23278
11 December 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 31
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY AND PEACE INITIATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 6 December 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit the text, in English and Russian, of a joint statement of the United States Department of State and the Ministry of External Relations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on El Salvador issued on 2 December 1991 (see annex). We also take the opportunity to reiterate the appreciation of our Governments for your skilful and tireless efforts on behalf of the cause of peace in El Salvador.

We should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Secretary-General.

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
United States of America

(Signed) Yuliy M. VORONTSOV
Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

ANNEX

Joint Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States of America statement on El Salvador: peace talks

Having reviewed the situation at the ongoing talks on the peaceful settlement of the crisis in El Salvador, the USSR Ministry of External Relations and the United States Department of State have agreed upon the following joint statement:

"The efforts made over the past year by the opposing Salvadoran parties towards ending the armed confrontation and assuring conditions in which all Salvadorans will be guaranteed equal, non-discriminatory participation in internal political processes have produced a number of important decisions. These provide realistic prospects for achieving early agreements to end the protracted conflict in this Central American country.

Of particular significance were the agreements reached during the April and September negotiating rounds between representatives of the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN leadership, conducted respectively in Mexico City and New York, with major contributions by United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and his personal representative at these talks, Alvaro de Soto.

The recent steps to terminate offensive combat operations taken by the Government and the FMLN have helped create favourable conditions for the success of the meeting between the representatives of the Government and the FMLN being held in Mexico.

The USSR and the United States believe that it is important that both the Government and the FMLN observe their announced commitments in order to sustain the emerging constructive approach. The USSR and the United States strongly urge the Salvadoran parties and the United Nations to extend every effort to achieve by the end of the year the goals set by the participants in the talks themselves: to agree on remaining issues; to reach agreement on an internationally supervised cease-fire; and to begin to implement measures aimed at national reconciliation. They note that a United Nations-supervised cease-fire is urgently required to consolidate the progress that has been made and to put a definitive end to the conflict.

The USSR and the United States declare their intention to continue to provide all possible support for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in El Salvador. They urge all the interested States and the United Nations to do everything possible to secure the earliest possible achievement of these objectives."

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/23279
11 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 DECEMBER 1991 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 10 December 1991.

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning
the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines, 1/ for facilitating full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991.

2. The first report of the Committee was submitted on 13 September 1991. 2/ Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review, no information, as requested by paragraph 12 of the guidelines, has been received by the Committee.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations ought to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, i.e. items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period under review, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to provide the Committee with any relevant information that may come to their attention. In that connection, the Committee received a letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa which the Committee considered and took note of at its 52nd meeting held on 18 October 1991.

6. In a note dated 2 October 1991, 3/ the President of the Security Council published the text of the statement made to the media, on behalf of the members of the Council. He stated that the members of the Council had held informal consultations on 2 October 1991 pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991). After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course

of the consultations, the President of the Council concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for a modification of the regime established by paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), as referred to in paragraph 21 of that resolution.

7. Since the submission of the previous report of the Committee on 13 September 1991, 2/ no allegations of violations, particularly in connection with paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), have been reported to the Committee, apart from the letter mentioned in paragraph 5 above.

8. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it. The Committee recommends that the Secretary-General should send an early reminder to those States that have not yet replied in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991) on measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). 4/

Notes

1/ S/22660, annex.

2/ S/23036.

3/ S/23107.

4/ The States that have replied so far pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991) are listed in the reports of the Secretary-General contained in documents S/22884, Add.1 and Add.2.